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 Radiation can have highly damaging effects on circuitry, especially for space 
applications, if designed without radiation-hardening mechanisms.  Delay-insensitive 
asynchronous circuits inherently have promising potentials in mitigating the effects of radiation 
due to their delay insensitivity.  This thesis proposes the use of two delay-insensitive 
asynchronous logic architectures to mitigate the eff cts of up to two single-event upsets (SEU) 
and a single-event latch-up (SEL).  The multi-bit SEU mitigation with SEL protection 
architecture improves the original design by providing more integrity against data corruption and 
lock-ups caused by multi-bit SEUs, and it is expanded to simultaneously provide protection 
against SEL.  The multi-bit SEU mitigation with data-retaining SEL protection architecture 
extends the original architecture by guaranteeing no data loss during the power cycling for 
mitigating SEL.  The results show that the proposed architectures function correctly, at the 
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 Radiation from outer space poses a serious threat to integrated circuits because of its 
ability to cause data corruption and even permanent damage.  More specifically, a Single-Event 
Upset (SEU) can cause a change of state for an internal node by discharging upon contact with 
the circuit.  While this type of event is non-destruc ive, the resulting change of state can lead to a 
permanent effect in the data should it be latched and propagate through the rest of the circuit.  
Without a golden reference or SEU-detection circuit, it may not be possible to know the validity 
of the resulting data.   
 A Singe-Event Latch-Up (SEL) is an event in which a charged particle causes a short 
circuit, for example, between power and the substrate.  This short can have a destructively high 
current that, if not dealt with, can cause permanent damage [1].  Since a power cycle is required 
to correct a SEL, current data propagating through the circuit is lost and must be recalculated.  
The result of the possibility of both an SEU and an SEL is not only potential data loss, 
corruption, or permanent damage, but also unreliability.   
 Because of the effects of radiation, special techniques and architectures have to be 
implemented in order to ensure the security and reliability of a circuit.  Delay-insensitive 
asynchronous circuits offer an advantage in this area because of their innate ability to 
accommodate the delay resulting from mitigating radiation effects.  NULL Convention Logic 
(NCL), an asynchronous logic design paradigm, provides a solid foundation for detecting an 
SEU, due to its dual-rail logic nature, and accommodates the interrupt and delay resulting from 
an SEL. 
 The Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with SEL Protection Architectures presented in this thesis 
expands on an original methodology to prevent the effects of an SEU.  Original components are 
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modified to add increased protection to particularly vulnerable areas.  This architecture also adds 
a protection component designed to detect the event of a SEL, correct the results of this event, 
and restore the circuit to normal operation.  Since this is a pipelined architecture, an individual 
stage, where the SEL occurs, can be power-cycled and restored to correct operation without 
interrupting other stages of the circuit. 
 The second architecture, Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with Data-Retaining SEL Protection, 
expands the first architecture to guarantee no data loss during the event of an SEL.  This addition 
takes advantage of the pipeline-nature in creating a DATA redundancy solution.  The ability to 
guarantee that no data will be lost during an SEL requires no additional delays beyond power-
cycling and resetting the specific stage, as requird for the first architecture. 
 The abilities of both architectures are tested using the 130-nm IBM 8RF bulk CMOS 
process.  A multiplier-based test circuit is used to simulate the architectures' correct working 
order, as well as their defense against a two-bit SEU and an SEL.  The results are promising and 
show the architectures' role in the future of radiation mitigation.   
 This thesis is organized in the following manner: Chapter 2 introduces NCL and explains 
the original methodology that is the foundation for this thesis; Chapter 3 explains each 
component and the requirements of the Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with SEL Protection 
Architecture; Chapter 4 covers the Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with Data-Retaining SEL 
Protection Architecture; Chapter 5 shows the normal operating conditions of the architectures 
along with simulating the effects of a two-bit SEU and an SEL; and Chapter 6 provides 







 NULL Convention Logic (NCL) is a delay-insensitive asynchronous circuit design 
methodology that uses multi-rail logic, in this case dual-rail logic, to create delay-insensitivity 
[2].  Each dual-rail logic signal has three possible states: DATA0, DATA1, and NULL.  DATA0 
(Signal0 = 1 and Signal1 = 0) corresponds to Boolean logic 0 and DATA1 (Signal0 = 0 and 
Signal1 = 1) to Boolean logic 1.  The NULL state (Signal0 = 0 and Signal1 = 0) is used to signify 
the signal does not have a DATA value.  The two rails of each signal are mutually exclusive, 
meaning the last state (Signal0 = 1 and Signal1 = 1) is an invalid state.    
 NCL circuits use a composition of 27 fundamental gtes, creating a complete set of 
functions for up to four single-rail inputs.  Most often a separate set of logic consisting of these 
27 gates is used to find the value of each rail.  Each gate is a threshold gate following the naming 
convention, THmn, where at a minimum  of the n inputs are required to be asserted for the 
output of the gate to be asserted.  This symbol is shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: THmn gate symbol [2]. 
 
 
NCL gates use hysteresis which requires the output to remain asserted until all inputs have been 
deasserted.   As a result, all inputs must be deasserted before each new set of data to ensure the 
output holds the correct result of the current data instead of retaining the result of the previous 
set of data. 
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 The threshold gate structure above is expanded to add weight to individual inputs such 
that an input can be worth more than one, following the naming convention ThmnWw1 2..wR 
[4].  The subscript of each weight refers to the input of the gate where R is less than or equal to n,
the number of inputs.  Each weight is assigned as an integer to the input denoted in subscript, for 
example TH34W2.  For this gate, the first input has a weight of two, which means the m 
requirement can be met if the first input and only one of the other three inputs are asserted.  A 
depiction of this threshold gate's structure is shown in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: TH34W2 symbol [4]. 
 
 
 In addition, many gates have reset functionality.  If the output is deasserted when the gate 
is instructed to reset, it is said that the gate res ts to '0'.  This type of gate is specified by adding 
an n on the end of the gate's name, for example TH22n.  Likewise, if the output of the gate is 
asserted when reset, it is said that the gate resets to '1' and is specified by a d following the gate 
name, for example TH22d.  Resettable gates are used in all registers to enable the circuit to be 
reset to a known state. 
 NCL circuits contain at least two delay-insensitive (DI) register sets at the beginning and 















Register sets communicate through the use of KO signals.  When a register set detects, through 
the use of a completion logic block, that the outputs of each register is all DATA or all NULL, 
the register set sends a KO (0) requesting for NULL (rfn) or a KO (1) requesting for DATA (rfd), 
respectively.   
 Each register uses resettable gates that take as input the dual-rail logic signal and KI 
signal.  By employing the use of the KI signal in each register, it is ensured that the regist r is 
unable to change its output to DATA or NULL until the following register set makes a request for 
DATA or NULL. 
 Because of the structure of the registers, every two consecutive DATA waves propagated 
through the circuit are separated by a NULL wave.  This prevents DATA from being overwritten 
by a preceding or succeeding DATA wave since a stage is flushed before a new DATA wave 
propagates through. 
 
2.2 Original Architecture 
 The architecture proposed by this thesis is based off of an architecture (Figure 4) that 
modifies the standard NCL architecture and uses double-modular redundancy to prevent SEUs 
from corrupting data as it propagates through each stage of the pipeline [5].  This original design 
modifies the standard NCL architecture in the following ways:  
 - Add a second copy of the circuit 
 - Replace the TH22n gates in the registers with TH33n 
  - Add a set of TH22 gates at the output of each register set (two register sets per stage  
  since there are now two copies of the circuit) 
 - Remove the completion logic from the register sets and add it to the end of the TH22  
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The second copy of the circuit is used to determine that the outputs of both register sets 
are equivalent at each stage, meaning the output is correct.  This is achieved by adding a set of 
TH22 gates at the output of the registers.  In each set of TH22 gates, there is one TH22 gate per 
bit being compared.  Since dual-rail signals use two bits to represent a logic value, two TH22 
gates are required to compare two dual-rail signals.  One of the TH22 gates is used to compare 
the rail0 component of the signal, while the other gate compares the values of each signal's rail1 
component.  In order for the output of the TH22 gates to change, both pairs of rail1 and rail0 have 
to be the same. Otherwise, the output will remain in its previous state.  If an SEU occurs in either 
copy of the circuit, the corrupted rail will be compared with its counterpart from the opposite 
circuit.  Since the two values are not the same, th output of the TH22 gate will not change.  
Once the SEU subsides, the corrupted rail will change to the correct value, which will be 
compared to its counterpart in the opposite circuit.  This will cause the output of the effected 
TH22 gate to be in the correct state.   
 Once the output of each TH22 set is correct, the data is propagated through the 
completion logic that was moved to the output of the TH22 sets.  The completion logic 
determines when all dual-rail signals are DATA, whether it is DATA0 or DATA1, or NULL.  
Since the input to the completion logic is based on data that has been compared by the TH22 sets 
to ensure correct values, the output of the completion logic will be correct.  There are two sets of 
completion logic.  One is attached to the output of he first circuit's TH22 set and the other is 
attached to the output of the second circuit's TH22 set.  This ensures that if an SEU occurs in 
between the TH22 sets and their corresponding completion logic block, it does not corrupt the 
completion signals which communicate to the previous register set when the stage is ready for 
NULL or ready for DATA.   
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 As stated above, this architecture uses two completion signals to communicate when a 
stage is ready for NULL or ready for DATA.  Both signals have to have the same value before a 
register set will send a NULL wave or DATA wave.  With this design, an SEU can occur on one 
of the KO lines, corrupting the propagation of DATA and NULL waves.  Since there are two KO 
signals instead of one, each register in a register set needs to devote two inputs to KO signals and 
one input to one rail of a data signal.  This results in using TH33n gates in the register sets 
instead of TH22n.  With two KO signals being used, the register ensures that both KO signals are 
correct and will know when one of the signals is effected by an SEU, due to its incorrect value.   
 
2.3 Single-Bit SEU Mitigation 
 Since the circuit is now dual-modular redundant, a type of voting system can be used to 
determine if there is an error caused by an SEU.  Regardless of which rail of a signal is affected 
by the SEU, the signal's counterpart in the opposite module will serve to show the error because 
the two rails do not match.  The TH22 gates that take both register sets' outputs perform the role 
of the voting system.  If the outputs of each register et do not match, then data cannot proceed 
past the TH22 gates.  
  It is important to note that the specific affected signal does not proceed, since the signals 
are compared one-by-one.  Since there is one signal that has not matched its counterpart in the 
opposite circuit, the COMP component does not detect a full DATA wave. This requires the stage 
to wait until the signal that was affected to regain its correct value before a full DATA wave is 
detected, and a NULL wave can be requested. This process prevents corrupted data from 
continuing.  Each stage will hold until all signals match their counterparts, meaning the values 
propagating to the next stage are correct. 
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 As soon as the SEU subsides, the data becomes correct, which is detected by TH22 gates.  
As soon as the DATA or NULL matches, meaning it is correct, it can proceed past the TH22 
gates into the completion blocks and combinational logic of the next stage.   
 The completion blocks create two separate KO signals to indicate that the output of each 
TH22 set is completely DATA or NULL.  Should an SEU affect one of the KO signals, both 
register sets will not incorrectly allow their outps to change because it requires both KO signals 



















3. Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with SEL Protection Architecture 
This architecture has two main purposes: 
 1.  Prevent up to two simultaneous SEUs from corrupting data or causing deadlock 
 2.  Detect an SEL and restore normal operation 

























 Before describing the process by which the architetur  mitigates SEUs and SELs, each 
component's addition or modification is explained for its place in improving the original 
architecture, beginning with SEU-mitigation components. 
  The following components enable the architecture to prevent errors from up to two 
simultaneous Single-Event Upsets: TH22 gates, COMP, and registers using TH44n gates.  
 
 3.1 TH22 Gates Component 
 Instead of sending the data from the registers directly to the combinational logic and 
completion block, the data from the output of each register set is sent to two sets of TH22 gates. 
These sets of gates serve to ensure the validity of the data coming from each register set by 
comparing the data to ensure faultlessness.  This is detected by the use of two TH22 gates per set 
of dual-rail logic data being compared.  For a set of dual-rail logic data being compared, for 
example input1 and input2, both input10 and input20 are input to the first TH22 gate while 
input11 and input21 are input to the second TH22 gate, as shown in Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6:  TH22 component for comparing two dual-rail logic signals. 
 
 
This structure prevents the output of both TH22 gates from changing until the rail0 and rail1 
components of input1 and input2 are the same.   
 Once the data being compared is the same for all inputs, the output of the TH22 gates 
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changes to reflect the same value as the data output from both register sets.  This data, which has 
been confirmed to be faultless, is now sent to the COMP component and combinational logic 
block for the next stage. 
 
3.2 COMP Component 
 For this architecture, a more robust wave signaling protocol is implemented by using 
three KO signals instead of two.  Without this change, this methodology is very susceptible to 
lock-up from two SEUs occurring on the KO signals, which will be further discussed later 
chapter 5.  
 Three KO signals are now used, instead of two, to ensure a stage's NULL wave or DATA 
wave is complete and a new DATA wave or NULL wave is requested, respectively, which 
requires a modified COMP component (Figure 7).  These three separate completion signals are 
created from the INa and INb, which come from the top and bottom TH22 blocks respectively.  
This ensures that the KO signals are correct.  Without this check, it would have to be assumed 
that an SEL did not occur between the output of the TH22 components and the output of the 










Figure 7: COMP component diagram. 
 
 
The first and second KO signals, KO1 and KO3, are created using the data from the top 
and bottom TH22 components, respectively.  These two completion blocks, INa.rail1 Completion 
and INb.rail1 Completion, use the completion component and TH12b gates to output the correct 
KO value.  This structure ensures that all of the individual dual-rail logic data have the value 
NULL or all have the value DATA before KO1 or KO3 can change. 
 For each dual-rail logic signal input into the COMP component, there is a TH12b gate.   
 The outputs from the TH12b gates are the individual KO signals for each dual-rail logic data.  In 
order to find the overall KO signal for the INa.Rail1 component or INb.Rail1 component, all of 
the individual KO signals have to be compared by using a completion component, which 
receives the TH12b gates' outputs.  The completion bl cks consist of TH44, TH33, and TH22 
gates.  These gates are used to AND together the output signals coming from the TH12b gates.  
By using this component, the output of the INa.Rail1 nd INb.Rail1 components cannot change 
from a value of 0 to 1 until all individual KO signals have a value of 1.  Likewise, the output of 
the INa.Rail1 and INb.Rail1 components cannot change from a value of 1 to 0 until all individual 
KO signals have a value of 0. 
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 By checking this requirement, the KO signals coming from INa.Rail1 and INb.Rail1 
components represent each dual-rail logic data output from the top and bottom TH22 
components.  KO1 and KO3 now correctly reflect that a NULL or DATA wave is complete and 
sends the correct request to the previous stage for the next DATA or NULL wave.   
 The last completion component, Rail0, creates a KO signal using both sets of dual-rail 
data coming from the top TH22 set and the bottom TH22 set.  The data for each set is sent 
through TH12 gates where there is a TH12 gate per each dual-rail logic data.  As in the INa.Rail1 
and INb.Rail1 components, the outputs of every TH12 gate are sent to the completion blocks. 
This signal is then inverted to create the correct KO signal, rfd or rfn.   
 Together, these three components determine that the data coming out of the bottom and 
top TH22 sets are both correct and complete, whether t y are complete NULL waves or 
complete DATA waves, and request for the next DATA or NULL wave. 
 
3.3 TH44n Registers 
 For a standard NCL register, two TH22n gates are used along with a TH12b to create a 
single register for each dual-rail logic data.   This structure allows for the use of one KI signal.  
Since this architecture uses three KI signals instead of one, a different register component is 
required. 
 In order to accommodate for the three KI signals received from the succeeding register 
stage, two TH44n gates are used in each register.  This enables each register to check each of the 
three KI signals before changing its output to 1, if all four inputs are 1, or 0, if all four inputs 
become 0, for both output0 and output1.  When the output of each TH44n gate is zero, neither 
output can change to a value of one until all three KI signals have a value of one.  Likewise, if all 
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three KI signals do not have a value of zero, the values of both rails of data cannot change to 
zero. 
 TH44n gates are used instead of TH44 gates so that the output0 and output1 of each 
register is equal to zero after a reset occurs.  This enables each register's output to be reset, which 
transitions the whole circuit to a known state.  Resetting to null is an important requirement that 
is discussed further in Section 4.1.   
 The TH12b gate remains in the register, just as itis used in the standard NCL register.  Its 
inputs depend only on output0 and output1 of each register.  Since the TH44n gates serve the 
same purpose as the TH22n gates in the standard NCL register, the TH12b gate is unaffected by 
the changes made for SEU mitigation. 
 This design prevents the corruption of a DATA or NULL wave passing through the 
combinational logic in each stage when one or two SEU affect the KO signals.  Even though 
there is a possibility of two of the KO signals having incorrect values due to two SEUs, the third 
KO signal prevents an incorrect DATA or NULL wave from being requested before the previous 
wave is finished. 
 The final two components, SEL protection and DATA redundancy, enable the architecture 
to detect an SEL and restore the circuit to normal operation without data loss. 
 
3.4 SEL Protection Component 
 The SEL protection component is used to detect an SEL and restore the circuit to normal 
operation.  Each stage of the circuit has one SEL protection component to prevent one stage's 
SEL mitigation process from interrupting or disturbing another stage.  Figure 8 shows the major 




Figure 8: SEL Protection component. 
 
 
 VDD is a separate VDD for each stage, and it is used a the input to the PFET Switch.  
When an SEL is not detected, the PFET switch is on and VDD is connected to the input of the 
resistor.  The purpose of the resistor is to vary the voltage of VDD based on the amount of 
current the stage is using.  When the stage uses more current, there is a higher voltage drop 
across the resistor.  The value of the VDD_Stage at the output of the resistor is then compared to 
Vref.  Vref is calculated through circuit simulation to be thevoltage of VDD when the maximum 
amount of current is being used by the stage.  By using this value, it is known that VDD_stage 
will only be a lower voltage than Vref if the stage is using an abnormally high amount of current, 
which causes a larger voltage drop across the resistor. 
 Vref is calculated by simulating the current drawn by each stage, since each stage will 
draw different amounts of current depending on the combinational logic blocks and number of 
registers used.  A small buffer to the Vrefs calculated for each stage to allow for error and 
changes in operating conditions.   
 If the two inputs, Vref and VDD_stage, are compared and VDD_stage is less than Vref, it 
is known that an unusually high amount of current is being drawn by the stage, and thus an SEL 




 When an SEL occurs, the PFET switch is turned off (input value of 1).  This cuts off the 
stage from power.  At the same time, the Grounding Switch, which contains an NFET, is turned 
on (input value of 1).  Since power is disconnected from VDD_stage, VDD_stage will now 
discharge to ground through the Grounding Switch.  Once the stage is grounded, the SEL 
protection block resumes normal operation, allowing VDD to pass through the PFET Switch. The 
SEL protection component continues to compare the voltage of VDD_stage and Vref, waiting for 
the next SEL occurrence, while the stage operates normally. 
 While the SEL protection component works correctly in preventing damage to the circuit 
and restoring normal operation when an SEL occurs, there is still a possibility of DATA loss if an 















4. Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with Data-Retaining SEL Protection Architecture 
 The purpose of this architecture is to modify the Multi-Bit SEU Mitigation with SEL 
protection architecture by adding data-retention to the SEL protection component, denoted as 





























4.1 DATA Redundancy 
 The DATA Redundancy component prevents the circuit from losing DATA when an SEL 
is detected and recovered from by the SEL protection c mponent.  It works by allowing each 
DATA wave to be immediately followed by another DATA wave containing the same DATA, 
meaning these two waves are not separated by a NULL wave.  Since the DATA is the same in 
two consecutive waves, if one of the two stages is reset when the circuit is being restored from 
an SEL, data loss will not occur because another copy of the data exists in either the preceding or 
succeeding wave.  The placement of the DATA Redundancy component is shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: DATA Redundancy diagram. 
 
 
 As seen in Figure 9, the DATA Redundancy component is added to the COMP 
Component.  It takes as input the KO signals from the three completion blocks (INa, Inb, and 
Rail0) as well as INc.  INc contains the three KO signals from the succeeding stage.  This 
structure causes a stage's KO signals to be impacted by the succeeding two stage.  
 Inside each DATA redundancy component are three TH22 gates.  Because of this, there 
are six individual inputs (two inputs per TH22 gate).  These inputs come from the KO signals of 
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the current and next stage (three KO signals per stage).  The output of each TH22 gate is one KO 
signal that is sent to the preceding stage. 
 With this design, a stage's operation (sending a NULL or DATA wave to the next stage) is 
dependent on the following two stages.  The two succeeding stages have to both request for 
DATA or both request for NULL.  When this situation ccurs, the first of the three stages sends 
its DATA or NULL wave as requested.  This situation ccurs for each set of three stages in a 
circuit. 
 One requirement for this design to work is that each register used in every stage can be 
reset to NULL, as opposed to reset to DATA.  This is why TH44n gates are used instead of TH44 
gates or TH44d gates.  Take the following situation t  understand this requirement: there is a 
DATA wave in stage four succeeding another DATA wave (stage three) followed by two NULL 
waves.  Since stage four and stage three both contain data waves, it is required that there are two 
NULL waves in front in stages five and six, as well.  This example is illustrated below in Figure 
11. 
 
Figure 11: Illustration of DATA Redundancy. 
 
 
 Figure 11 above shows six stages.  Each stage can ither be processing a NULL wave or 
DATA wave, but only in groups of two.  Each NULL wave is immediately followed by a NULL 
wave, and each DATA wave is immediately followed by a DATA wave with the same DATA.   
Figure 12 is a table showing what happens during the reset of a specific stage when an SEL 




State Stage 1 Stage 2  Stage 3 Stage 4 Stage 5 Stage 6 
1 NULL NULL DATA DATA NULL NULL 
2 NULL  NULL DATA NULL NULL NULL 
3 NULL  NULL DATA DATA NULL NULL 
Figure 12:  Effects of an SEL. 
 
 
 The first state shows the stages in a circuit when SEL are not occurring.  Each set of two 
NULL cycles is followed by a set of two DATA cycles and each set of DATA waves is followed 
by a set of two NULL waves.   
 Now assume an SEL occurs in stage 4 during state 1.  This is detected by the SEL 
protection component and causes the stage to be reset.  Since the stage is reset before the DATA 
wave is finished and received by the succeeding stage, the DATA is lost and the current wave is 
now a NULL wave.  Since each DATA wave is followed by a DATA wave of the same value, 
stage 3 still has the DATA that was lost when stage 4 was reset.  Similarly, if stage 3 is reset due 
to an SEL, the stage loses its DATA and is now processing a NULL wave.  Since stage 4 contains 
the same data wave that stage 3 had before an SEL occurred, the DATA is not lost. 
 State 2, in Figure 12, shows the resulting waves for each stage after an SEL occurs in 
stage 4.  Because of the DATA Redundancy component, the circuit can still continue normally.  
Since stages 4 and 5 have completed their NULL waves, the three KO signals from stage 4 
request DATA from stage 3.  The same situation occurs for stages 5 and 6.  Since both of their 
NULL waves have completed, stage 5 requests data from stage 4.  Stage 4 currently has a NULL 
wave, so stage 5 must wait until stage 4's next DATA wave completes.   
 State 3 shows the current waves after stage 4 requests DATA from stage 3.  Since stage 3 
has the same data wave as the original data wave in stage 4 during state 1, stage 4 now has the 
same data wave that it lost during the SEL occurring in state 1.  The circuit has now recovered 
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from the SEL occurrence and can continue in normal operation.   
 One of the important components that allows this de ign to work is using TH44n gates in 
all of the registers for each stage, instead of TH44 gates or TH44d gates.  Since the TH44n gates 
reset to NULL, any register that uses them resets to NULL.  When stage 4 resets during state 1, 
stage 4 has to be NULL in order to recover from the process.  This is important because both 




















5.  Scenarios and Simulations 
 Both architectures are tested at the transistor level using a five-by-five multiplier in the 
IBM 130-nm 8RF process.  In order to test both archite tures, injection points are set up such 
that while unaffected, both circuits behave normally.  When being tested, these injection points 
can be changed to incorrect values, as would be caused by an SEU, or cause a reset, as would be 
caused by an SEL. 
 The first simulation shows what the results should be under normal operating conditions.  
Since the two architectures differ only in how they r spond to radiation, the results will be the 
same regardless of which architecture is used. 
 This test begins with resetting the multiplier to a known state.  Since TH44n gates are 
used in all registers, the output of each register set becomes NULL after a circuit-wide reset.  The 
NULL wave output by each register set is sent to the TH22 gates component where the values of 
the top and bottom register outputs are compared.  Since the outputs match, as they are both 
NULL waves, the data is sent through to the COMP comp nent.  At this point, there are still no 
errors, and the data from outputs of the top and bottom TH22 gates is correct.  The COMP 
component detects complete NULL waves from the TH22 gates and, as a result, requests a DATA 
wave to each previous stage.     
 
 




Figure 13 shows the three KO signals' output from the first stage of the circuit, as well as 
the main reset signal.  It is important to note that this signal is not the same as the reset signal 
used in the SEL protection component.  The SEL protection component can only reset the 
individual stage where it checks for SEL occurrences.  These KO signals in Figure 13 tell the 
outside world when the circuit is ready for a new DATA wave or NULL wave, and as soon as the 
circuit is reset (the end of the reset is marked by the red arrow), all three KO signals request a 
new DATA wave from the controller of the multiplier. 
Figure 14: Waveform of input signal b.
 
 
 Figure 14 shows the values of the second input signal, b.  This input is one of the two 
five-bit dual-rail logic operands.  Signal b alternates between DATA and NULL, as requested by 
the three KO signals in Figure 13.  To simplify the demonstration, b holds a value of '1' during 





Figure 15: Waveform of input signal .
 
 
 The second five-bit dual-rail logic operand of themultiplier, a, is shown in Figure 15.  As 
seen in the waveform for b, a alternates between DATA and NULL values as requested by the 
first stage of the multiplier.  This process continues as data propagates through each stage of the 
multiplier, and is eventually output as a result.  The input values of a vary widely to indicate 




Figure 16: Waveform of output signal, result. 
 
 
 Result, as shown in Figure 16, is a ten-bit dual-rail logic signal.  Since the high-order five 
significant bits of the signal remain DATA0 for each DATA wave, only the low-order five bits 
are shown.  To complete this demonstration, Figure 17 is used to show the integer values of each 
input and output signal at the times shown in each waveform for a, b, and resulta. 
 
 
Input Time (ns) a  b resulta Resulta time (ns) 
10 3 1 3 19 
18 0 1 0 31 
30 1 1 1 44 
44 3 1 3 56 
56 7 1 7 68 
Figure 17: Table of the inputs, a and b, and the result of operation, resulta. 
 
 
 The values in the table are correct, and show the correct operation of the multiplier test 
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circuit.  Each waveform can be referenced from the values in the table to confirm the operations 
and the correct outputs.  The next scenarios cover the mitigation of two-bit SEUs and an SEL 





















5.1 Two-bit SEU Scenario 
 





Signal (Marker) Initial State Second State Final State 
KI1 (1) rfd rfn rfd 
KI2 (2) rfd rfn rfd 
KI3 (3) rfd rfd rfd 
Top register set output (4) DATA DATA DATA 
Bottom register set output (5) DATA DATA DATA 
Figure 19: States of signals during two-bit SEU scenario. 
 
 
 Figure 19 shows the states of various signals of the architecture (Figure 18) during the 
progression and mitigation of two SEUs on the KO signals, which are sent from the right-most 
stage (stage two) to the left-most stage (stage one).  A marker is shown in parenthesis next to 
each signal in the table.  These markers correspond to the red numbers shown in Figure 18.  In 
the table, the initial state shows normal operation in that all KO signals from stage two, which 
are the KI signals for stage one, are requesting data (rfd).  At this point, data is propagating from 
the output of the register sets in stage one through the TH22 sets and onto the combinational 
logic.   
 The second state in Figure 19 shows what immediately happens when two SEUs occur 
that affect KI1 and KI2.  Choosing these two signals is arbitrary.  The eff cts would be the same 
if this demonstration used any two of the three KI signals of any given stage. 
 As seen in Figure 19 during the second state, KI1 and KI2 are affected by the SEUs and 
temporarily have values of zero (rfn).  During this time, KI3 retains the correct value of one (rfd).  
If KI1 and KI2 together controlled stage one, stage one would be temporarily allowed to send a 
NULL wave.   
 Since there is an additional KI signal, KI3, in the new architectures, KI1 and KI2 are 
unable to corrupt the data and possibly cause a lock-up.  In the final state of Figure 19, KI1 and 
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KI2 go back to their original and correct values of 1 nce the two SEUs subside, and the circuit is 
able to continue in normal operation. 
 For a moment, assume there is not a third KI signal, as in the original architecture.  With 
the two KI signals (KI1 and KI2) effected by two SEUs and controlling the first stage, the NULL 
wave would corrupt the DATA that is currently propagating from the output of stage one, which 
is the DATA propagating through the TH22 components and combinational logic blocks, at this 
point.   A lock-up would occur after KI1 and KI2 temporarily transitioned to rfn and back to their 
correct values, rfd.  During the time that KI1 and KI2 are incorrect, a partial-NULL wave is 
propagated throughout the TH22 sets and combinational l gic eventually reaching the inputs of 
the register sets for stage two.  At this point, part of the correct DATA is erased, due to the 
partial-NULL wave, leaving some registers with inputs of DATA and others with inputs of 
NULL.  The problem now is that stage two is still waiting for DATA, but the DATA is corrupted.  
Until it receives a complete DATA wave, it cannot send a request for NULL.  It will continue to 












5.2 Two-bit SEU Simulation 
 
 
Figure 20: Waveforms of SEU-affected KO signals and input signal .
 
 This simulation tests the architecture's ability to mitigate two SEUs that affect the KO 
signals between two stages. 
 The problem with one stage having two KO signals is the possibility of those two KO 
signals being affected by two SEUs at the same time.  If two SEUs changed the value of both KO 
signals, the inputs coming from the previous stage could propagate through the next stage before 
they should.  This situation could result in incorrect data being processed or even cause the 
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whole circuit to lock-up. 
 To mitigate this issue, three KO signals are used between each stage.  Figure 20 shows 
five different signals.  Signals sTwoC, outTest_0, and outTest_1 are the KO signals coming out of 
stage two of the circuit.  The signals te t4a, test4b, and sTwoC are the actual KI signals for stage 
one.  This means that test4a and test4b the injection signals, as explained at the beginning of this 
section.  
 During the circuit's normal operation, test4a and test4b have the same value as outTest_0 
and outTest_1, respectively.  Since they are injection inputs, test4a and test4b can also have 
values other than that of utTest_0 and outTest1.  The structure of  the test4a and test4b inputs 
allow the simulation of two SEUs on the KO signals between stage two and stage one of the test 
circuit. 
 As seen in Figure 20, the circuit stops its operation when test4a and test4b's values do not 
match the value of sTwoC (top arrow of Figure 20).  This means that the KI signals for stage one 
have different values (two KIs have a value of 0 and the last KI has a value of 1).  Even though 
the signal sTwoC is requesting DATA from stage one, stage one will not send DATA until both 
test4a and test4b have a value of 1, matching the request of sTwoC.  
 Figure 20 elaborates on this situation by showing the circuit's operation is stopped by the 
two SEUs, which are affecting test4a and test4b.  Until these two signals return to normal 
operation, where they are equal to sTwoC given by stage two, the overall operation of the circuit 
is halted.  
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Figure 21: Result signals. 
 
 
 In Figure 20, the circuit only propagates one set of input DATA, the multiplication of a 
set of inputs when INa is equal to '3' and INb is equal to '1' (Inb retains a value of '1' for all 
simulations).   Because of this, the resulta signal only shows one output, the multiplication of '3' 
and '1'.  Figure 21 shows the output is correct because only resulta_0 and resulta_1 have a value 
of DATA1 (shown by the red arrow), which is the integer value 3 for the resulta signal as a 
whole.  The second set of inputs is never propagated through due to the simulated effects of two 




5.3 SEL with Data Recovery Scenario 







Signal (Marker) Initial State Second State Third State Final State 
KO1 (1) rfd rfd rfd rfn 
KO2 (2) rfd rfd rfd rfn 
KO3 (3) rfd rfd rfd rfn 
SELreset (4) 0 1 0 0 
Bottom register set output (5) NULL NULL NULL DATA 
Top register set output (6) NULL NULL NULL DATA 
Stage data (7) DATA NULL DATA DATA 
Stage data (8) DATA NULL DATA DATA 
Figure 23: Shows the progression of a latch-up recov ry. 
 
 Figure 23 shows the values of signals and their makers (corresponding to the red 
numbers in Figure 22) as an SEL occurs in the circuit and later resumes normal operation. 
 During this scenario, DATA is propagating through the stage (markers 7 and 8) as the 
SEL occurs, which is the initial state.  The output of the registers (markers 5 and 6) are both 
NULL and, as a result, are requesting DATA from the pr vious stage using KO1, KO2, and KO3.   
 The second state shows the signals as the stage is reset (marker 4) consequentially erasing 
the DATA in the stage (markers 7 and 8).  The DATA does not reach the output of the bottom and 
top (markers 5 and 6) register sets, so the values of the bottom and top register sets remain 
NULL.  Since the outputs are still NULL, the stage still requests DATA from the previous stage. 
 In the third state, the SELreset is disabled and the circuit can resume normal operation.  
The DATA from the preceding stage is output and set a  he value of stage data (markers 7 and 
8).  Since each DATA wave is immediately followed by a DATA wave of the same value, the 
erased DATA during the SEL is replaced with the same DATA from another DATA wave.   
 The final state shows the recovered DATA now progressing to the next stage, meaning the 
output of the top and bottom (markers 5 and 6) regist r sets are now the recovered DATA.  The 





5.4 SEL with Data Recovery Simulation 
 This test shows the effect of resetting stage two of the five-by-five multiplier during an 
SEL while the circuit is processing data.  
 
Figure 24: Input a and KO values. 
 
  
 Figure 24 shows the three KO signals coming out of the first stage of the circuit.  These 
three signal tell the controller of the circuit when to send a NULL wave or DATA wave.  Shortly 
after 80 ns (when the reset signal is turned on for stage two marked by the red arrows in the 
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figure), an SEL is detected and all three KO signals are halted, meaning the circuit has ceased 
operation at some stage during operation.  It is important to note that even though this stage has 
stopped operating, data that has previously passed through this stage can still propagate through 
the rest of the pipeline to the output.  
 Figure 24 also shows the progression of input values for a, which is a five-bit dual-rail 
logic signal.  The other input value for the circuit, b, has an integer value of one for the entire 
duration of this simulation.  As can be seen in Figure 24, the value of a changes from DATA to 
NULL.  The integer values of during each DATA wave of a between each NULL wave include 
values 0 at 20 ns, 1 at 35 ns, 3 at 45 ns, 7 at 60 ns, 15 at 70 ns, and 31 at 80 ns.  The manualReset 
signal shown in the Figure 24 is the reset signal used by the SEL protection component 
specifically for stage two of the multiplier.  This stage is arbitrarily chosen for showing the 
effects of this architecture.  The same process and result could be demonstrated on any stage of 
the multiplier. 
 As seen in Figure 24, manualReset is enabled at 80 ns.  Once this manualReset is 
enabled, the circuit stops taking in new DATA and NULL waves for a and b, and any DATA or 
NULL waves before stage three's register set cannot propagate through the rest of the circuit.  
Because of this, the value of a at 80 ns is held at the integer value 31 until the reset is turned off.  




Figure 25: The results of the first five calculations. 
 In Figure 25, it is shown that the results are unaffected despite resetting an individual 
stage of the multiplier.  The value of resulta after the second red arrow in Figure 25 is 31, which 
is correct since 31 (a) is multiplied by 1 (b).  The process of detecting and recovering from the 
SEL only delays the outputs without losing any of the DATA. 
 Since the reset caused by the SEL only affects stage three of the circuit, any DATA being 
processed by stage four and on will continue to propagate giving a result value after the last 
stage.  This is shown in Figure 25 because each input for a (which is multiplied by 1) is seen as a 









6. Conclusion and Future Works 
 Radiation is a huge concern for electronics, especially for space applications, due to its 
ability to change the state of signals or cause permanent damage to the chip.  The multi-bit SEU 
mitigation with SEL  protection architecture modifies the original architecture to create a more 
robust, SEU-resistant architecture, while including SEL recovery, by adding a third completion 
block with a corresponding third KO signal per stage, using TH44n gates in the registers instead 
of TH33n gates, and adding an SEL protection component.  The multi-bit SEU-mitigation with 
Data-Retaining SEL protection architecture takes th first architecture a step further to guarantee 
no data loss when an SEL occurs.  Significant weaknsses of the original architecture, such as 
the latch-up problem with the KO signals, are improved upon to further the radiation-hardness of 
the architectures.   
 Using an IBM 130-nm process, a test five-by-five multiplier was created to simulate the 
new architectures.  It is shown that with the newly created components, the architecture works 
correctly in outputting the correct data.  Next, a scenario was presented in which the architecture 
was able to correctly mitigate a two-bit SEU when simulated at the transistor-level.  The two-bit 
SEU only affected the circuit by causing a short delay until the SEU subsided.   Finally, a 
scenario was shown in which the Multi-bit SEU Mitigation and Data-Retaining SEL Protection 
Architecture was affected by an SEL.  The second architecture correctly resolves the effects of 
the SEL without losing any data. The results of these simulations show the effectiveness of both 
architectures, which are promising for building space electronics for radiation hardness.  
 While the techniques used in this thesis to mitigate the effects of radiation work correctly, 
additional work could be made in improving the defensive abilities of both architectures.  If these 
architectures were tested with radiation, additional weaknesses could be identified.  With this 
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